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Abstract 
A new coronavirus disease (COVID-19) caused by a novel pathogen (SARS-CoV-2) 
spread rapidly around the world in the early months of 2020, and was declared a 
pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) on 11 March. COVID-19 has, and 
continues to have, large implications for individuals, societies, and for national health 
systems across the globe. Due to its novelty and impact, it has challenged all health 
care systems where the virus has taken hold.  
 
The ways in which governments and health systems have responded have varied 
widely across the world. In the case of Nepal, the pandemic represented a major test for 
the newly decentralised health system, created as a result of the implementation of the 
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2015 federal constitution. This paper, which forms a part of our large on-going study of 
the decentralisation of the health system in the country, presents some of the early 
evidence on the effectiveness of the actions taken by Federal, Provincial and Local 
Governments and the levels of cooperation and coordination between them. 
 
 
Introduction 
A country’s health status is closely related to its wider political context, including 
availability of resources and the exercise of good governance (Subedi, 2018). The 
Declaration of Alma Ata (1978) states that every responsive health system should be 
able to deliver well designed packages of promotive, preventive, curative and 
rehabilitative health programs to the population. Yet large-scale health emergencies 
such as natural disasters or outbreaks of infectious diseases highlight whether and how 
a country’s health care system works in practice, and then quickly reveals its strengths 
and weaknesses. Globally, the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed serious inequities in 
health care delivery and access to services both within and between countries - as well 
as emphasizing issues such as the lack of adequate Personal Protective equipment 
(PPE) for health care workers, shortage of testing facilities, equipment and reagents, 
and the generally low levels of investments into many national health systems.  
 
Crises not only put additional pressure on already overstretched health systems, but 
also take attention and resources away from existing health problems, causing further 
challenges for health service delivery. For example, despite the huge death toll caused 
by the Ebola outbreak in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2014-16 (over 11,000 
deaths amongst almost 30,000 confirmed cases), it was later noted that during that 
crisis more people in the affected countries died from measles, malaria, HIV/AIDS, and 
tuberculosis than from Ebola itself (Elston et al. 2017). This served as a clear illustration 
of the knock-on consequences of health systems being moved into a ‘crisis response’ 
mode of operation, in which routine prevention, treatment and care services come under 
strain.  
 
On the other hand, in some cases crises can lead to positive effects on other health 
issues. Anecdotal evidence from UK hospitals suggests that the rigorous handwashing 
advised by the government to combat COVID-19 has resulted in fewer cases of the 
infectious disease Clostridium difficile (commonly known as C. difficile). The “lockdown” 
measures have also reduced air pollution in major cities worldwide (Shrestha et al. 
2020). For example, China’s Hubei province reduced the notorious air pollution in 
Wuhan, the provincial capital (Calma 2020), which must have had a positive effect on 
patients with COPD, with similar findings reported from Barcelona, Spain (Tobías et al 
2020) and Milan, Italy (Collivignarelli et al. 2020), whilst the lack of tourists in Venice, 
Italy, due to COVID-19 travel restrictions resulted in much cleaner water in its canals 
(Braga et al. 2020).  
 
The COVID-19 pandemic struck at a particularly challenging time for Nepal’s health 
system. In some areas, services are yet to fully recover from the decade-long civil war 
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and massive earthquakes of 2015, and the country has since begun a major process of 
health system reform after the promulgation of the 2015 Constitution.  Health system 
decentralization has been an important part of the Nepali state’s effort to devolve 
greater power and resources in recent years.  The Local Self Government Act in 1999 
had introduced some of the core values of decentralization, and produced some 
devolved based on the subsidiarity principle. Efforts were made to build and improve 
health service provision at grassroots level. However, under the 2015 constitution this 
move towards decentralisation significantly expanded.  What had previously still been a 
relatively centralised model, with the key decisions being made in the Ministry of Health 
and Population in Kathmandu, became significantly and rapidly decentralised, with 
important new mandates and responsibilities for the new provincial and local levels of 
government. 
Although this decentralisation process was well-underway when the first case of 
COVID-19 was detected in Nepal in January 2020, many aspects of the transition to the 
new system were incomplete and new structures and relationships had not had a 
chance to establish or ‘bed down’. Even more than many other countries, then, Nepal’s 
health system faced an additional set of challenges, namely how to cope with, and 
effectively respond to, COVID-19.  
One of the commonly claimed advantages of more decentralised health systems is that 
they can provide greater responsiveness to local conditions and needs (Muñoz et al. 
2017). Indeed, in many countries that have implemented similar health system reforms 
to those underway in Nepal, the desire to ensure greater local responsiveness has been 
one of the primary reasons for implementing decentralization. A responsive health 
service system has to address both medical and non-medical needs and expectations 
of the population proactively to improve health-related indicators, to minimize financial 
risk to the population (for example, those related to the catastrophic expenditures) but 
also, in the current COVID-19 crisis) to be able to effectively control the spread of 
disease and treat the sick. It should also be able to adapt to effectively address 
disparities in the level of health problems between different areas of the country or 
between different sub-populations. 
As Nepal’s COVID-19 epidemic has developed, there have been significant differences 
in the extent to which provinces and districts have been affected (Table 1). In this paper, 
written during the epidemic (summer 2020) and therefore necessarily preliminary in its 
conclusions, we examine responses to the crisis at different governance levels to 
consider the extent to which the ongoing process of decentralising the health system 
has indeed allowed for a greater degree of responsiveness to local conditions, and 
whether the levels of government have been able to successfully coordinate their 
actions to ensure an effective response to the crisis.  
 
COVID-19 in Nepal: The spread of the epidemic through the country 
The first case of COVID-19 in Nepal was reported in mid-January 2020 in a Nepali 
student returning from Wuhan, China (Bastola et al. 2020). By July 29, Nepal still had 
relatively few cases of COVID-19 (n= 19,273) for a country with some 28 million people, 
and had recorded a relatively low number of COVID-related deaths (n= 49) (Ministry of 
Health and Population 2020). It is known with some certainty that, as in most countries, 
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the limited testing conducted will mean that these figures considerably underestimate 
the actual scale of infection in the country. However, even taking into account such 
under-detection of cases, something can still be said about the way in which the virus 
spread through the country. In comparison with many other countries, Nepal reacted 
relatively early. A travel ban was put in place for visitors from the most affected regions 
(Europe, West Asia and the Gulf Countries, Turkey, Malaysia, South Korea and Japan) 
on 18th March (Department of Immigration 2020) - at which point Nepal had only one 
confirmed case. The borders were closed to all incoming travelers soon after (on 22nd 
March 2020). The Government of Nepal also moved early to implement a lockdown - 
including in Kathmandu which, at the time of the lockdown, had reported only two cases 
(both in recent returners from abroad) and zero deaths. Although reliable data is limited 
by the lack of testing, anecdotal evidence suggests that at this stage there was not 
widespread undetected community transmission. Although there were controversies 
around undertreatment, medical negligence, and suicide at a quarantine facility, the 
overall result of these actions was that, in the early stages of Nepal’s COVID-19 
epidemic, cases and deaths were concentrated in the Terai.  These were mostly among 
travelers returning over the land border from India, or those who had direct contact with 
migrants returning from India. Both India and Nepal had implemented a lockdown 
strategy at similar times (in the third week of March), but after two months, travel 
restrictions were eased in India and Nepali migrants started returning home. The hill 
and mountain areas - including Kathmandu - were affected relatively little at this stage. 
But despite these efforts, the country only managed to delay the spread, and did not 
succeed in preventing the transmission of the virus through the population. 
 
Table 1.  Province-wise distribution of COVID-19 cases (July 29, 2020) 
Province  Population 
(2011) 
Total confirmed cases 
(% of total cases) 
Active cases 
n= 
Deaths 
n=  
1 4,532,943 1,018 (5.28) 235 0 
2 5,404,145 5,016 (26.03) 2,046 13 
Bagmati 5,529,452 1,017 (5.28) 505 10 
Gandaki 2,403,757 1,537 (7.97) 326 5 
5 4,741,716 4,291 (22.26) 403 10 
Karnali 1,327,957 1,984 (10.29) 303 4 
Sudurpaschim 2,552,517 4,410 (22.88) 1,542 7 
Total  19,273 (100%)  49 
Source: Ministry of Health and Population 
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https://heoc.mohp.gov.np/update-on-novel-corona-virus-covid-19/ 
Gradually, then - despite restrictions on internal movement - the virus spread into new 
areas of the country. Low levels of risk awareness, the failure to effectively manage 
movement across the Indo-Nepal border, poorly managed quarantine facilities, the 
irrational use of face masks, a lack of sufficient water to allow for the following of hand 
hygiene guidelines, the continuation of meetings and other group gatherings in defiance 
of lockdown rules, and a lack of proper physical distancing, and many other factors, all 
played a part in contributing to the spread. At the time of writing, cases have been 
identified in all seven Provinces - albeit the distribution remains uneven (see Table 1). 
 
The need for both national and local responses 
The uneven development of the epidemic throughout the country highlights the need for 
both national and local responses, which should in theory effectively implement the 
overall policy direction set by the national government, but in a way that is adapted to 
local conditions. Again, this is not unique to COVID-19: indeed it is often even more true 
of other kinds of health emergencies, such as those caused by landslides, volcanic 
eruptions or floods, which tend to be localized events affecting only part of a country. 
Local capacity and agency allows emergency responders to adopt a more focused 
approach, channeling attention to the afflicted area and population by drawing on 
resources from other parts of the country.  
However, as we have seen with the development of the national-level epidemic over 
time, what sets COVID19 apart from other kinds of disasters is that it has the propensity 
to affect many regions simultaneously. A pandemic is made up of multiple national 
epidemics, and a national epidemic is made up of multiple localized outbreaks. For 
localized outbreaks, local responders who know their area - and have strong links with 
key stakeholders and communities - are best able to ensure outbreak responses that 
are tailored to the local community. It is not easy for local outbreaks to be managed 
from a distance. Rather than imposing a top down model of prescriptive solutions to 
resolve the local needs, locally developed plans and programs are more effective at 
tackling problems at a local level.  
In order to achieve that degree of responsiveness, local teams need the necessary 
resources to respond appropriately, such as access to relevant virological and 
serological tests, disease surveillance systems, expert advice, and additional skilled 
human resources where necessary, as well as more general operational resources and 
capacity. Strengthening primary health care services and the empowerment of local 
agencies are some of the effective measures which are important to urgently mitigate 
the crisis situation. National government therefore has a role in supporting and 
facilitating the efforts of local agencies, as well as frontline workers.  
At the same time, there may also be actions (for example, those relating to border 
restrictions) which will inevitably require the national government to take the lead. 
Therefore, a balance - and cooperation between levels - is required: while centralized 
control may not always be efficacious, purely localized responses risk being fragmented 
and discoordinated, especially if the outbreak spans local geographical boundaries 
which require the efforts of multiple areas to be joined up. It seems clear, therefore, that 
the key to an effective response in Nepal lies in effective action at all levels of 
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government (Local, Provincial and Federal), with strong coordination between the 
levels, and with resources flowing down (and information flowing up), rapidly and 
reliably. In the remainder of this article, we examine the emerging evidence from the 
COVID-19 response so far to consider whether this has been achieved by the health 
system (and the wider government system) in Nepal. As we argue below, in the early 
phase of the pandemic (up until the end of July 2020) there has been a lack of adequate 
support by the central government to cope with the current crisis, local government has 
often been lacking proper guidance and the necessary technical and financial 
resources, and coordination between levels has often been problematic. 
 
Local, Provincial and Federal responses to COVID-19: emerging evidence 
Since this article is being written in the midst of the pandemic, its findings can by 
definition only be preliminary. Nevertheless, in this section, we examine the emerging 
evidence on the effectiveness (or otherwise) of (1) local and national responses, and (2)  
communication and coordination between governance levels. 
 
Local and Provincial responses 
The diverse nature (social, economic, topographical) of Nepal means that each local 
area faces a unique set of challenges. In addition, the provinces vary widely in their 
resources, including in the health system. Table 2 shows there are now 28 COVID-19 
testing laboratories active across the country, however these remain concentrated in 
Bagmati Province (n=10) and testing capacity in other provinces (which includes areas 
where a large number of people have been quarantined) remains limited.  
 
Table 2.  COVID-19 testing laboratories and tests conducted by province 
Province  Laboratories conducting 
PCR tests * 
PCR tests conducted 
n= * 
Quarantined ** 
1 3 46,523 1,644 
2 3 21,759 9,490 
Bagmati 10 1,57,960 1,522 
Gandaki 2 22,655 2,285 
5 5 50,191 14,629 
Karnali 3 39,645 2,840 
Sudurpaschim 2 19,611 15,829 
Total  28 3,58,344  
Ref:*COVID-19 Situation Reports. Ministry of Health and Population (Nepal). (*July 29, 2020)  
**https://covid19.ndrrma.gov.np/ (accessed: 30-07-2020) 
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On many occasions, limited testing capacity in some provinces has meant that swab 
collections have had to be halted (e.g. Nepali Times 2020), and samples transferred to 
the central laboratory. As a result, the testing of thousands of collected swabs has been 
delayed, and the daily figures stated at the Ministry of Health’s press briefing have 
seriously underestimated the actual level of risk prevalence in the community. Such 
problems have led not only to delays in timely identification of COVID-19 cases, but 
have also increased the duration of people’s stay in quarantine centers, thereby 
increasing the risk of new COVID infections. The variation in capacity between 
provinces during the pandemic reflects pre-existing inequalities: whilst the country as a 
whole suffers from a shortage of trained health professionals (the doctor-patient ratio, to 
use just one indicator, is 0.17 per 1,000 population - substantially less than the WHO 
recommendation of 2.3 doctors per 1,000 population (Adhikari & Mishra, 2016)), what 
human resource does exist is spread very unevenly, with the remote areas such as 
Karnali Province having even greater human resource shortages than other parts of the 
country (Karnali Ministry of Social Development, 2020). 
As well as the Provincial governments, local governments (and local healthcare 
facilities) have important roles to play in responding to COVID-19 - and again, these 
have been hampered by the resources available, as well as by the effectiveness of 
management. Locally-run quarantine centers - especially in areas close to the Indian 
border - have often been found to be inadequate for appropriately and safely managing 
the huge influx of migrant returnees. Often excessively crowded and in some cases 
lacking in basic facilities such as water, sanitation and adequate sleeping facilities, 
these quarantine centers have been labeled as “virus incubators” and “hotspots for 
COVID-19” (Sapkota & Paudel 2020). Quarantine centres have also had cases of 
suicide (Wagle 2020), deaths due to illnesses such as typhoid and diahorrea, sexual 
assault, and of people escaping, for example in Naumule Rural Municipality in Karnali 
Province (WION 2020).  
There is, however, some evidence of effective local action and crisis management - 
highlighting some of the benefits of decentralization and reflecting the constitutional 
responsibility of local government for basic health and sanitation (Schedule-8, 
Constitution of Nepal, 2015). Local governments have played significant roles in, for 
example, reaching marginalized communities with public health information, and 
providing practical support. District administration offices in border districts facilitated 
the returns of Nepali migrants stuck at the Indo-Nepal border after the lockdown was 
enforced and, along with the federal and provincial governments, various civil society 
organizations were engaged in a diverse set of roles to facilitate the returns of migrants 
to their homes. The adoption of Local Health and Sanitation Acts in many jurisdictions 
has also enabled the acceleration of local-level policy formation, providing new legal 
powers for emergency response and allowing faster adaptation to the developing 
situation on the ground (Dhrubaraj 2020). Other local efforts - including the distribution 
of relief packages to those impacted by lockdowns - have made a real difference, even 
though resources have been constrained. 
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Contact tracing of confirmed cases has been another major task at the local level, and 
has often required both outside support and the imposition of local lockdowns. To take 
one example, when a woman from Katuwal Pauwa in Dhading District tested positive, a 
WHO team from Kathmandu visited the village to conduct contact tracing, and the 
village was sealed off for four days (under the Infection Disease Act 2020, section 2 and 
the Local Administration Act 2028, Section 6, Subsection 2). However, contract testing 
capabilities are increasingly coming under strain. Although contact tracing has been 
effective in preventing transmission in the early phase of the national epidemic, the 
increasing number of cases means that contact tracing has become one of the biggest 
challenges facing the government’s COVID management committee due to the lack of 
sufficient staff and unprecedented rate of positive cases increasing daily.  
 
National responses 
As in many other countries around the world, the national government in Nepal has 
faced a huge range of COVID-19 related issues, including both the direct health effects 
of the disease, but also the wider economic and social problems the pandemic has 
generated. We noted above that (compared to many other countries) Nepal locked 
down relatively early. In this section we examine some of the consequences of that 
decision, before moving on to look at the role of the federal government in procurement 
and distribution of essential supplies, and the development of laboratory facilities to 
enhance testing capacity. 
 
Although it is too early to properly judge the effectiveness of the timing or duration of the 
lockdown adopted by the Government of Nepal on 24th March 2020, the decision seems 
(initially at least) to have slowed the spread of the virus within the country. However, as 
in other countries, the policy also had significant socio-economic consequences. The 
massive outflow of migrants from the Kathmandu valley to other districts revealed the 
problems facing the working class in the initial days of lock down. The lack of 
transportation meant many were forced to walk hundreds of kilometers to reach their 
villages, creating particular problems for women, children and the elderly. For both 
those who stayed and left the city, the financial losses and job insecurity faced by many 
households were severe, with many lower-income groups - particularly daily labourers - 
being especially badly affected. The knock-on consequences of lockdown also included 
problems relating to food production and distribution (Mahato et al. 2020), mental health 
and wellbeing (Brooks et al. 2020; Shigemura et al. 2020; Bao et al. 2020), gender-
based violence, and an increased rate of suicide (Singh et al. 2020). And even though 
there were substantial numbers of suicides in pre-COVID, the rate increased during (as 
did reporting of them in the media). In addition, misinformation and disinformation 
related to COVID-19 - often spread by social media - has created concern and anxiety 
amongst many people. Nepal was certainly not the only country to experience all of 
these consequences, and it is difficult to argue that the lockdown decision was ‘wrong’. 
Yet it is clear that, at best, the government only partially managed to mitigate the socio-
economic effects of the decision. 
One significant achievement, led by the Federal government, has been the increase in 
laboratory capacity referred to above. In March 2020, Nepal had only one testing lab (in 
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Kathmandu) which was only able to process a maximum of 600 tests per day (and in 
practice far fewer). At the time of writing this has been expanded to 28 labs across the 
country (see Table 2) with the capacity to process around 8,000 tests a day (although at 
the time of writing the actual number of tests done per day is in the 4-5,000 range). This 
is an impressive achievement by any measure, and one that has undoubtedly increased 
the ability of authorities at all levels to detect cases, and (where possible) to implement 
contact tracing to limit the spread of the virus.  
 
Coordination between levels 
The COVID-19 crisis quickly created the need for new coordination mechanisms to 
manage the national response. After the media, civil society and health activists 
pressurized the government to respond proactively, a high-level coordination committee 
for COVID-19 prevention and control was formed on 1st March 2020. The inter-
ministerial committee, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, was restructured to form 
the Corona Crisis Management Centre (CCMC), which has moved forward with 
measures like lockdown along with mass testing, a quarantine strategy, relief supplies 
for those in need, and a massive public awareness campaign. Despite this, there have 
been areas in which coordination has not functioned effectively.  
 
In some cases, as with quarantine centres, Local government felt that the Federal 
government had passed them the responsibility without the necessary support and 
resources. The Federal government prepared a protocol on quarantine management, 
but this protocol faced many barriers to effective implementation at the local level, 
including a lack of availability of health workers and security personnel, not having a 
building with CCTV or proper sleeping facilities, lack of sanitation and so on. At the 
same time, local governments had already spent a large amount on relief distribution 
and procuring medical supplies. The result was that central and local government 
blamed each other for some of the failures around quarantine, which also created 
frustration among citizens.  At times there has been a sense that other issues, including 
inter-party conflict and border issues, have diverted the government's focus away from 
COVID. Although the government has promised to increase the health budget for next 
fiscal year, the limited health budget as a proportion of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) 
and uneven allocation between Provinces - combined with poor coordination between 
different levels of Government - has restricted local level COVID responses.  
 
With Provinces gaining greater policy-making powers, there have been contradictory 
messages and actions. In the case of inter-district travel, for example, Kathmandu 
announced that people entering the valley would have to show a COVID test certificate, 
but government testing sites have strict guidance on whom to test, and needing to travel 
to the capital is not one of the criteria. Kathmandu dropped this requirement after about 
two weeks, as it was not practicable. Some districts have imposed strict quarantine on 
everyone entering, while others have not seemed to control those entering. To some 
extent these localised decisions on quarantine and lockdown are a good indicator of a 
system that is displaying local responsiveness. The epidemic has followed different 
trajectories in different localities - just as it has in other countries (e.g. COVID-19 
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policies differ between the four nations of the UK, with lock down restrictions varying 
between say England and Scotland or between Northern Ireland and Wales). However, 
in some cases the differences in approach seem to have been less about variations in 
local transmission rates, and more about a lack of a common and coordinated approach 
across the country. 
 
Conclusion 
Even within the first few months of the pandemic in Nepal, we have seen some 
differences in health service provisions and wider response policies across different 
Provinces and districts. Some of these differences will relate to the unequal spread of 
COVID-19 across the country (i.e. epidemiology) and other differences are bound to 
relate to slight differences developing between Provincial and Local health systems. Still 
others may relate to different prioritisations of existing health organisations. Some say 
‘crises offer opportunities’. The COVID-19 crisis will not be over in the short term, and 
there are important lessons to be learnt from the initial phase in terms of the strengths 
and weaknesses of Nepal’s newly decentralised health system. How can the benefits of 
local responsiveness be captured, without losing the benefits of a coordinated national 
approach? Our research project, which was designed before COVID emerged, was 
always planning to examine precisely these kinds of tensions. COVID-19 has given it a 
new urgency and a new importance. We hope that we can contribute to ensuring that 
Nepal maximises the ability of the health system to respond effectively, to control the 
disease and to save lives. 
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